Why have WikiLeakS.org abandoned the use of PGP Encryption ?
The Contact page still has a link to a http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks_PGP_key page:
Do not use PGP to contact us. We have found that people use it in a dangerous manner. Further one of the Wikileaks key on several key servers is FAKE.
This warning now replaces a copy of the PGP Public Encryption Key which expired on 2nd November 2007 (PGP Key ID: 0x11015F80).
Instead of publishing a new PGP Key, the WikiLeakS.org staff have, without bothering to hold any sort of discussion on the relevant wiki discussion page, arbitrarily put up this stupid warning.
It is entirely possible for the public and for journalists and for whistleblowers to use unencrypted plaintext email, or the SSL / TLS web encrypted web session submission forms for new "whistleblower document" uploads, or the Tor Hidden Service methods, or the Postal mail box methods of submission, or the Discussion pages for publishing comments and analyses, and to make technical security or anonymity errors
in a dangerous manner.
Why is PGP any different ?
Presumably because the WiklLeakS.org team have deliberately not bothered to explain its correct use - they just published a link to a PGP public key, with nothing else in the way of instructions or warning advice.
The point about the PGP keyservers is utterly irrelevant, given that WikiLeakS.org were, correctly, publishing their PGP key primarily on their own web servers
Fake PGP keys on keyservers or elsewhere are not a problem - that is what the PGP key fingerprints are designed to help with.
This outright refusal to use widely available, tried, tested, and secure PGP / GnuGP / OpenPGP etc . software. has further damaged the reputation for trustworthiness of the WikiLeakS.org project.
Some people will conclude that some of the WikiLeakS.org people must be in cahoots with some intelligence or police agency or other, which is why they do not wish to promote the option of using strong end to end encryption like PGP for protecting whistleblowers.